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We compare nonparametric and nonstructural market power tests using data from the
cigarette manufacturing industry.  Tests are implemented to examine both monopoly and
monopsony power exertion by cigarette manufacturers.  Results indicate that market power in the
tobacco industry, previously attributed to monopoly power exertion, should at least in part be
attributed to monopsony market power in the upstream tobacco market.    
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Introduction
Nonparametric and nonstructural tests of market power offer alternatives to parametric tests
of market power in that they circumvent the issue of functional form choice for behavioral equations
(Ashenfelter and Sullivan 1987, Hall 1988, Varian 1984).  Both approaches rely on price and quantity
data for inputs and output but do not rely on a specific technology specification.  Additionally, data
requirements are less for nonparametric and nonstructural market power tests than for parametric
market power tests because supply or demand relationships in the opposing market need not be
specified.
Nonstructural market power tests are computed from actual changes in costs rather than from
assuming profit maximization and estimating the slope of the demand schedule as do most parametric
market power studies (Hall).  Recent studies (Hall; Domowitz, Hubbard and Peterson (1988); Hyde
and Perloff (1994); and Roeger (1995)) develop nonstructural market power tests that compute a
monopoly markup or monopsony markdown term and technology component based on Solow
residuals.  A simple regression generates a testable hypothesis of market power.  Thus, nonstructural
techniques offer a compromise between traditional econometric estimation of market power which
must assume a specific underlying technology and nonparametric methods which are deterministic
in nature.  Although nonstructural market power tests give a testable hypothesis regarding market
power, they do have some inherent problems.  Nonstructural market power tests rely on the
assumption of constant returns to scale (CRS) and thus test the joint hypothesis of competition and
CRS (Hall, Roeger).  More importantly, previous applications have used identical approaches to test
for monopoly or monopsony market power (Hall, Hyde and Perloff).  Thus, the question remains3
whether this approach can be useful in distinguishing monopoly or monopsony power as the
underlying source of market power exertion.
The primal profit-maximization approach used to develop nonparametric market power tests
provides dissimilar empirical equations for monopoly power and monopsony power.  In addition,
nonparametric market power tests do not make the assumption of CRS.  However, previously
developed nonparametric market power tests exhibit methodological weaknesses.  Some studies have
assumed stable cost and demand conditions and ignored factors that may bias market power
measurements, such as technical change (Ashenfelter and Sullivan). However, Love and Shumway
(1994) have included measures of technical change in their implementation of a monopsony market
power test. An additional criticism of previous nonparametric market power tests is that they do not
incorporate stochastic variation, and as such, have no probabilistic interpretation.  In effect,
nonparametric deterministic tests are based on an exhaustive search for violations of the underlying
hypothesis.  If a violation is detected, the underlying hypothesis is rejected.  Ashenfelter and Sullivan
mention this as a criticism of nonparametric tests in general, as does Varian (1984, 1985).  However,
Varian (1984, 1985) has developed nonparametric  statistical tests based on measurement error or
goodness of fit that provide a basis for evaluating the seriousness of optimization violations.    
In this paper, in addition to developing nonstructural monopsony market power tests and
nonparametric monopoly market power tests, we also implement nonstructural and nonparametric
market power tests for monopoly and monopsony market power using cigarette manufacturing
industry data.  Conveniently, each test requires the same data whether testing for monopoly market
power or monopsony market power.  This allows an interesting comparison between nonstructural
and nonparametric market power tests.  We compare Hall’s and Roeger’s test for monopoly market
power and the analogous monopsony market power test to three nonparametric tests:  a revised1The only study which considers monopsony power by cigarette manufacturers that
the authors are aware of is Hamilton.  His study analyzes cigarette manufacturing data from
the period 1924-1939 for joint oligopoly-oligopsony.  His results suggest that oligopolistic
cigarette pricing was practiced during this period by cigarette manufacturers, but that
oligopsonistic coordination of leaf tobacco purchases was not present.
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Ashenfelter and Sullivan test, Love and Shumway’s linear programming test, and a new
nonparametric quadratic programming statistical test.  The three nonparametric tests are developed
for both the monopoly and monopsony cases.  All follow the revealed preference approach of
Ashenfelter and Sullivan.  We extend Ashenfelter and Sullivan's approach by incorporating cost data
and omitting shifts in the opposing market.  Love and Shumway's nonparametric monopsony power
test is modified for the monopoly case.  A nonparametric statistical test is developed for both the
monopoly and monopsony cases that includes the possibility of stochastic errors in optimization and
technical change.  
The U.S. cigarette manufacturing industry provides an appealing market for this analysis since
Ashenfelter and Sullivan focus on this industry and both Hall and Roeger include results from the
tobacco industry.  Previous studies have considered monopoly power exertion by tobacco processors,
but their potential monopsony power in procuring tobacco from domestic growers has received little
attention (Ashenfelter and Sullivan, Hall, Roeger, Sullivan, Sumner).
1  We examine the relationship
between cigarette manufacturers and wholesalers as well as the behavior of cigarette manufacturers
in procuring domestic tobacco.  While manufacturing data at the two-digit SIC level is often used to
examine monopoly power in the industry (e.g., Roeger, Hall), we conduct our analysis using more
specific four-digit SIC code data.  We also incorporate costs of domestic and imported tobacco,
labor, advertising, capital, and materials.  Empirical results suggest that cigarette manufacturers exert
monopsony power in addition to commonly assumed monopoly power.  5
This paper is organized as follows.  First, we present a brief discussion of potential market
power in the cigarette manufacturing industry.  Next we present Hall’s and Roeger’s nonstructural
market power tests and develop the analogous tests for monopsony market power.  Nonparametric
tests, including Ashenfelter and Sullivan’s test, a revised Ashenfelter and Sullivan test, Love and
Shumway’s test, and a new statistical test, are developed for both the monopoly and monopsony
cases.  We then implement these nonparametric and nonstructural tests to analyze cigarette
manufacturers’ potential monopoly and monopsony power exertion.  Empirical results are followed
by concluding remarks.
The Cigarette Manufacturing Industry
The cigarette manufacturing industry has long been touted as an example of an imperfectly
competitive industry.  Given the high level of concentration that exists in this industry, monopoly
power exertion by cigarette manufacturers is certainly plausible.  In 1992, the industry contained only
eight firms with the four largest firms supplying ninety-three percent of cigarette production (Census
of Manufacturers, special tabulation).  However, concentration measures also support the possibility
of cigarette manufacturers exerting monopsony power in procuring domestic tobacco.  In 1995, U.S.
tobacco growers produced 1,268 million pounds of tobacco, 933 million pounds of which was sold
domestically for the production of cigarettes.  While there are thousands of tobacco growers, each
has access to a very limited number of buyers for the product.  Tobacco is also a highly specialized
crop, both in production and in use.  As stated in Rogers and Sexton (p. 1143), "...the relevant
markets for raw agricultural products will typically be narrower with respect to both product class
and geography than the markets for the finished products they produce.”  The relatively inelastic
supply of tobacco, due to the farm program supply restrictions, and high buyer concentration suggest
the potential for monopsony market power exertion by cigarette manufacturers.6
Several studies of the cigarette industry have examined monopoly power of cigarette
manufacturers in the retail market (Sumner, Sullivan, Ashenfelter and Sullivan).  Market power
exertion has typically been measured by examining firms' responses to varying excise tax levels.
Sumner discusses the possibility of upward biases on measurements of cigarette manufacturers'
monopoly power exertion due to added market power exertion by wholesalers and retailers.
However, he assumes that the large number of firms in these segments of the marketing chain leads
to minimal monopoly power exertion.  Sumner assumes that any distortion in pricing by cigarette
manufacturers is passed through these two segments directly to consumers with little bias.
Ashenfelter and Sullivan, Sullivan, and Sumner all maintain this assumption in using retail level price
and quantity data in their analyses.  Sumner rejects both competition and collusion and contends that
the industry operates at some level of oligopoly.  Ashenfelter and Sullivan, along with Sullivan, reject
the perfect cartel case and argue instead that the industry exhibits at least a “moderate” level of
competition. 
Measuring Imperfect Competition
Market power is defined as deviation from marginal cost pricing.  Such deviations may be in
the form of monopoly power, where output price is greater than marginal cost (MC), or in the form
of monopsony power, where input price is less than the value of marginal product (VMP).
Nonstructural market power tests measure the relationship between price and marginal cost by
comparing actual growth in the output/capital ratio with the expected growth given the rate of
technical progress and growth in the labor/capital ratio (Hall).  Differences between actual and
expected growth are attributed to market power.  Nonparametric market power tests employ a
revealed preference approach founded on the weak axiom of profit maximization (WAPM).  For
consistency with competitive behavior, WAPM states that the observed input and output quantity2The nonstructural tests presented require time-series data; however, we omit the
time subscripts for notational simplicity.
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choices at output price p and input prices rm must yield profit at least as great as any other quantity
set that could have been chosen (Varian, 1984).  If a firm is exerting market power, it will be
evidenced by the quantity choices made in each period.  
The nonstructural and nonparametric market power tests presented here are developed from
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where p is output price, yi is firm i’s output, xmi is quantity of variable input m demanded by firm i,
rm is the price of input m, x is the vector of variable inputs, and Fi(x) is firm i’s production function.
Nonstructural Tests
Nonstructural tests do not require functional form specification of the firm’s technology.
They have an added advantage over nonparametric tests of including a statistically testable hypothesis
concerning market power exertion, but they require the additional assumption of  CRS.
Consequently, such tests are a joint test of competition and CRS (Hall).
2  Hall’s and Domowitz,
Hubbard, and Petersen’s nonstructural monopoly market power tests use a primal approach based
on the Solow residual.  Roeger extends their work by incorporating a dual measure of the Solow
residual.  
Primal Approach  
Following Domowitz, Hubbard and Petersen’s notation, we develop their monopoly market
power test for a firm with one output y and three inputs: capital, x1; an aggregate of variable inputs
other than domestic tobacco, x2; and domestic tobacco, x3.  Their test also assumes autonomous8
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Hicks-neutral technical progress.  Under these assumptions we can represent the industry’s
production function as: 
where ( is the rate of Hicks-neutral technical progress and A represents a productivity shock. 
Assuming CRS technology and competitive behavior in all input and output markets, the Solow
residual (Solow) for this technology is represented by:
where output and inputs are normalized by input x1 and hence y/x1 = y, x2/x1 = x2 and x3/x1 = x3 and
where   (See Appendix A). "xi ’ fxixi/y ’ rixi /py, i ’ 1, 2, 3
The Solow residual assumes that output is valued at its marginal cost.  Hall argues that in the
presence of monopoly market power, firms can sell incremental output for more than what they pay
for incremental inputs.  Hence, the firm’s profits will rise in excess of input cost.  In this case the
Solow residual must be modified.  If the firm’s market price exceeds its marginal cost, then the
variable cost share "v
* is equal to (P/MC)("x2+"x3).  Hence the Solow residual becomes
where $ is the monopoly Lerner index   is the rate of Hicks neutral technical ($ ’ P & MC
P
) , 0 (
change and   is the instantaneous percentage change in productivity shock.  0 A/A
Equation (4) gives Domowitz, Hubbard and Petersen's estimating equation for monopoly
market power exertion and is similar to Hall’s.  Domowitz, Hubbard and Petersen's test yields a
testable hypothesis regarding $
 mp where positive values of $
 mp indicate monopoly market power
exertion.  The primary difference between the two tests is that Hall does not directly estimate the9
monopoly Lerner index, but instead estimates the monopoly markup’s reciprocal (H= 1/µ
mp where
µ
mp is related to the monopoly Lerner index as $
 mp=(1-1/µ 
mp).  Hence the monopoly Lerner index
is recovered by  $
mp=1-(H.  If µ
mp = 1, industry pricing is perfectly competitive.  If  µ
 mp > 1, price
exceeds marginal cost and monopoly market power is being exerted. 
In equation (4),   represents an observable error term since input use is simultaneously 0 A/A
determined by the firm with output.    is likely correlated with the productivity shock  .  To 0 y/y 0 A/A
obtain a consistent estimate of $, instrumental variable estimation must be used and an instrumental
variable must be found that is correlated with movements in output but is uncorrelated with the
productivity shock.  Using Hall’s approach, market power estimation depends critically on finding
an appropriate instrumental variable.  Hall’s tests rest on the simple proposition that, 
to the extent that the firm is noncompetitive, its measured productivity will be associated with
its rate of growth of labor input over fluctuations associated with an exogenous instrument.
When productivity rises along with employment in response to an outside force, it is a sign
that the firm is not competitive. (p. 928)
The instrumental variable must be positively correlated with output, but neither be caused by
productivity fluctuations nor result from productivity fluctuations.  Demand shock variables are ideal
candidates for instruments for identifying monopoly market power exertion while supply shock
variables are good candidates for estimating monopsony market power exertion.  However, finding
appropriate instrumental variables for a specific industry can be problematic and estimation results
are sensitive to instrument choice (Roeger). 
We  extend Hall's and Domowitz, Hubbard and Petersen’s nonparametric monopoly market
power test to test for monopsony market power exertion in a single input market.  The principal10
0 y/y & "x2 0 x2/x2 & "x3 0 x3/x3 ’ 0 A/A % 0 ( % $"x3 0 x3/x3 (5)
difference from the monopoly test is that the right-hand side explanatory variable is domestic tobacco
input cost share multiplied by an instantaneous percent growth in domestic tobacco input use whereas
in models of monopoly market power, the right-hand side explanatory variable is instantaneous output
growth.  The Solow residual assumes that all inputs are valued at their respective marginal value
products.  With monopsony market power, when a firm expands output it will be able to purchase
the input in which it has market power (x3) at a proportionately lower price than its internal value to
the firm.  As in the monopoly case, the firm’s profits will rise in excess of input cost and the Solow
residual must be modified to reflect this possibility.  If the firm's marginal value product of an input
(x3) exceeds its market price, then its cost share "x3
* must equal "x3 (VMP/r3).  Hence the Solow
residual becomes




before.  Positive values of $ indicates monopsony power exertion while $=0 indicates perfectly
competitive behavior.  As previously discussed, implementation of the test requires instrumental
variable estimation since     is likely correlated with the productivity shock  .   "x3 0 x3/x3 0 A/A
Primal-Dual Approach
Hall’s and Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersens’ tests are based on a primal formulation of the
Solow residual.  Roeger extends this nonstructural method by including a dual measure of the Solow
residual, which does away with the need for instrumental variable estimation.  Roeger’s nonstructural
equation for monopoly power exertion is based on the difference between primal and dual Solow
residuals. 11
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Following Roeger, we first develop the dual Solow residual under perfect competition and
then later relax this assumption by allowing market power exertion.  A general cost function C (@) for
a firm operating under perfect competition and constant returns-to-scale is:
where G(@) is the unit cost function and is homogeneous of degree 1 and all other variables are
defined as above.
The dual Solow residual can be obtained in several steps.  First, assuming perfect competition
in the output market, the price dependent supply is given by:
(7)   p = M C(·)/My = G(r1, r2, r3)/Ae
( .
Now, totally differentiating (7) with respect to time and dividing by P or G(·)/Ae
( as appropriate
gives:
From Shepard’s Lemma MC/Mri = MG/MRI " Q /Ae
( = xi, so MG/MRI = xi Ae
(/Q.  Substituting this result
into (8) and recognizing Ae
(/QG = 1/C gives
Assuming constant returns to scale technology and competitive input markets, the input cost share
rixi/C  = "xi and "xi = 1 - "x2 - "x3, using these definitions in (9) gives:
where p = p/r1, r2 = r2/r1 and r3 = r3/r1.
The price-based Solow residual in equation (10) assumes that output is valued at its marginal
cost.  However, if firms are exerting monopoly market power, output will be sold for a price greater12
(1&$) 0 p/p ’ "x2 0 r2/r2 % "x3 0 r3/r3 & 0 A/A & 0 (. (11)
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than marginal cost.  To include this possibility in the Solow residual, let $=(p-MC)/p be the monopoly
Lerner index.  It follows that MC = p(1-$).  Substituting this expression into (10) gives
Rearranging in terms of the price-based Solow residual gives
Denoting the left-hand side of (12) SRP and the left-hand side of (4) SR and substituting for  0 A/A
in (4) gives the estimating equation for $:
(13) SR - SRP = $(0 y/y + 0 p/p).
Following Roeger, under the maintained assumptions that factors can be instantaneously
adjusted and no measurement errors exist in the data, the difference between the primal and dual
Solow residuals should be equal to zero in all periods if there is no monopoly market power exertion.
In reality, there are measurement errors associated with data collection and all inputs are not adjusted
instantaneously.  As a result, an error term must be appended to equation (13) to form the estimating
equation.  However, unlike Hall’s test, the error term associated with equation (13) should not
generally be correlated with the explanatory variable since it represents errors in measurement and
not systematic errors in productivity growth associated with input use.  Indeed any systematic errors
in productivity growth   should exactly offset one another when the dependent variable is 0 A/A
measured as the difference between the primal and dual Solow residuals.  As a result, the monopoly
Lerner index can be estimated from equation (13) with an additive error term using ordinary least
square regressions.  Roeger does note conditions under which error terms associated with equation
(13) may exhibit serial correlations and/or heteroscedasticity.  13
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A primal-dual nonstructural test of monopsony power can be developed in an analogous
manner.  The price-based Solow residual contained in equation (10) assumes that all inputs are valued
at their respective marginal value products, i.e., each is paid its respective factor cost share.  If firms
are exerting monopsony market power in the domestic tobacco market, firms pay a lower price for
domestic tobacco than the internal value of domestic tobacco to the firm.  Again, the Solow residual
must be modified to include this possibility.  Let $ = (VMPx3 - r3)/r3 be the monopsony Lerner index,
then VMPx3 = ($ +1)r3.  Substituting this expression into equation (10) gives
which can be rearranged in terms of the price-based Solow residuals:
The estimating equation for the monopsony power test is developed from difference of the primal and
dual Solow residuals which incorporate the possibility of monopsony power exertion.  Denoting the
left-hand side of (15) SRP and the left-hand side of (5) SR and substituting for   in (5) gives the 0 A/A
estimating equation for $ in the case of potential monopsony power exertion:
(16) SR - SRP = $"x3(0 x3/x3 + 0 r3/r3).
With market power in the case of domestic tobacco, this differential is equal to the monopsony Lerner
index times the domestic tobacco cost share times the sum of the instantaneous percent change in
domestic tobacco use and the instantaneous percentage change in domestic tobacco price. 
Nonparametric Tests
Nonparametric tests offer an advantage over parametric tests because results are independent
of functional form (Varian, 1984, 1985, 1990).  Initial market power studies in this area, such as
Ashenfelter and Sullivan, extend the axioms of revealed preference to include the pricing advantage
that market power can give.  Such tests exploit the idea that firms with market power will restrict14
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quantities in order to maximize profits and that, at observed prices, there is no other quantity choice
that will yield a higher profit.  For the perfectly competitive firm, the discrete profit-maximizing
condition is
)Bi ’ p)yi & j
n
m’1
rm)xmi # 0 . (17)
Here we assume that prices are exogenous since the firm cannot influence prices through input or
output quantity choice.  However, a firm with monopoly power can influence output price p by its
choice of output level yi.  In this case, the first-order condition becomes
)Bi ’ p)yi % yi)p & E
n
m’1
rm)xmi # 0 . (18)
Nonparametric methods typically parameterize the second left-hand-side term of the inequality,
commonly known as the monopoly markup term, by multiplying it by a monopoly power index like
$
mp.  In the perfectly competitive case, the firm cannot influence output prices so $
mp=0.  If the firm
is exerting monopoly power, p is no longer exogenous since the firm’s choice of yi can influence
output price.  The degree of this influence is measured by $
mp.
The revealed preference approach can also be applied to the monopsony case where we
consider potential market power in an input market, xn.  The monopsonistic firm’s profit-maximizing
condition in discrete terms is
where xki is the quantity of variable input xk  purchased by the ith firm and xni is the amount of xn
purchased by the ith firm.  Input price rn is no longer exogenous since the quantity of xn purchased
by firm i influences price.  The monopsony markdown term is the fourth left-hand-side term.3Ashenfelter and Sullivan’s assumption of an upward sloping cost function, C(yi),
maintains the integrity of the inequality when input costs are omitted from the test.  If we
assume yi
t < yi
s so that C(yi
t) < C(yi
s), the upper bound for $
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Analogous to the monopoly case, it is parameterized with monopsony power index $
ms.  In perfect
competition, the firm cannot influence input prices so $
ms=0.  
Ashenfelter and Sullivan
Ashenfelter and Sullivan's nonparametric monopoly power test is based on the primal profit
maximizing condition in equation (19).  They use average retail prices and average per capita
consumption by state in evaluating the reaction of cigarette producers to changes in marginal cost via
changes in excise taxes. The market power index, $
mp, is attached to the monopoly markup term.  The
test assumes that costs other than the excise tax are stable so that changes in the excise tax (et) are
equivalent to changes in marginal cost.  This assumption allows measures of cost other than excise
tax to be omitted from the test and greatly lessens the data requirement.  A stable demand function
is also assumed, resulting in an upper bound estimate of monopoly power.  In application, the test is
 
where et
s represents the excise tax in effect during time period s.
3  Market power exertion, $
mp, can
only be  rejected in favor of more competitive structures.  This measure is then used to obtain a lower
bound for nt, the “numbers equivalent of Cournot firms”, where nt$1/$
mp and represents the smallest
number of Cournot firms that the industry can support (Sullivan).  Ashenfelter and Sullivan’s test is
based on the maintained hypothesis that supply and demand functions do not shift.  In reality, both
supply and demand can shift through time.  To minimize measurement error in the tax data and the16
possibility of false rejections of market power exertion due to supply or demand shifts,they only apply
their test to pairs of points which are no more than two years apart.  
Ashenfelter and Sullivan’s pioneering nonparametric market power test suffers from two
admitted weaknesses: (1) the assumption of stable cost functions and (2) the assumption of a stable
demand curve in the opposing market.  While Ashenfelter and Sullivan attempt to limit these
problems by considering only pairs of points from the same region and close in time, a more precise
remedy can be implemented.  It is reasonable to assume that the cost structure of a firm or industry
may change over time.  These changes can be accounted for by including measures of cost for each
period.  It is also reasonable to assume that substitute prices, income or consumer preferences and
thus market demand may shift over time.  When comparisons are only made between “near” data
points, valuable information from comparisons where shifts did not occur may be lost.  Since a
demand shift unmatched by a shift in supply will cause output price and quantity to move in the same
direction between observations, deleting comparisons where )yi has the same sign as )p can also
reduce the possibility of false rejections (Love and Shumway).  Such movements are clearly not
attributable to market power exertion.  Likewise, in the monopsony case, input prices and quantities
may move in opposite directions between observations due to shifts in input supply unmatched by
shifts in input demand.  In developing the analogous test for monopsony power, we delete
comparisons between time periods when )rn does not have the same sign as )xni.
Ashenfelter and Sullivan also point out that their model is quite simple and omits potentially
important factors, such as advertising.  We further enhance Ashenfelter and Sullivan’s test by
incorporating the cost of advertising.  The revised monopoly power test is17
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where means “same sign as”.  The analogous monopsony test, based on equation (19), is s
’
where  means “not the same sign as”. s
￿
Love and Shumway
More recently, nonparametric market power tests have incorporated measures of other
variables which, if not accounted for, could distort market power measurements.  Love and
Shumway's inclusion of technical change measures in their deterministic monopsony power test is
based on previous tests for profit maximization under perfect competition by Chavas and Cox (1988,
1990, 1992) and Cox and Chavas.  To incorporate technical change measures, consider the primal
profit maximization problem presented in equation (1).  Fi(x)$yi can be redefined as Fi(x)$Yi(yi,A)
where Yi denotes “effective output” and A>0 is a vector of technology indices.  Fi(x) is assumed to
be strictly increasing and concave in x, and Yi is assumed to be a strictly increasing function of y.
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where yi(Yi, A) is the inverse function of Y i(y i, A).  Assume the firm chooses input and output
quantities (x, yi) over T time periods where each time period is characterized by input prices r
t, output
price p
t, and technology A







T} with the profit maximization hypothesis while considering the degree of market
power exertion.  
Recall that the firm with monopsony power in an input market, xn can influence input price
rn by its choice of input level  , resulting in equation (19) as a profit-maximizing condition.  It is xni
implicitly assumed in our revealed preference discussion of (11) that )yi = y
s - y
t.  If we assume
instead that )y i = y
 t - y




ts.  This equation simply restates WAPM in terms of the quantity choice at time t, i.e.,
at observed prices in time t, the observed quantity in time t yields at least as much profit as any choice
observed in another time period.  The price flexibility of the ith firm’s perceived residual supply curve















where VMP ni is the marginal value product of the nth input for the ith firm (Love and Shumway).
Thus 0i
ts  is a direct measurement of the monopsony Lerner index, $
ms.  The monopsony market




t.  If $
ms= 0, then firm i believes it cannot impact
input price by adjusting quantity purchased.  If $
ms > 0, then firm i perceives the residual supply curve
it faces as upward sloping and that it is exerting market power in the input market by reducing
purchases of xni below the competitive level.  Equation (24) gives the necessary and sufficient19
conditions for the firm’s decision set Si to be consistent with profit maximization (See proposition
1 in Chavas and Cox, 1990).      
Empirical implementation of the market power test requires an assumption about the form of
technical change.  Chavas and Cox (1990) provide a thorough presentation of choosing hypotheses
about technical change which make the problem empirically tractable without imposing a parametric
model of technology.  We assume their output translating case that presumes Hicks-neutral technical
change.  Output translating technical change leaves the marginal rate of substitution between inputs




technical change and a
- denotes negative technical change.  Assuming output translating technical






s-.   
The inequality in (24) involves variables which are not directly observable.  Therefore, the
market power test consists of finding whether values exist for a
+, a
-, and mi
ts which satisfy the
inequality.  Since (24) is linear in the unobserved variables, we can define z as the vector of
unobserved variables, i.e. a
+, a
-, and mi
ts, and rewrite (24) as d’z$c using appropriate definitions of
the matrix d and vector c and where ’ denotes the transpose (Cox and Chavas, 1990).  The market
power test can now be implemented as the linear programming problem:
min
z
{b ) )z: d ) )z$c, z$0} . (25)
In practice, we again delete comparisons between time periods when )rn does not have the same sign
as )xni, i.e. supply shifts without corresponding demand shifts, and search over s￿t.    
The test is easily adapted to the monopoly power case.  A firm with monopoly power
influences output price p by its choice of output level yi resulting in equation (18) as a profit-20
maximizing condition.  We incorporate the possibility of technical change so that the equation
becomes 



















t, and other variables are defined as before.  The price flexibility of the ith firm’s













also be interpreted as the monopoly Lerner index since   where MCi is marginal cost Ti’[(p&MCi)/p],
for the ith firm.  Solutions for the monopoly Lerner index, $
mp, are recovered by $mp ’ mpi
ts/p t.
Again, we can determine if solutions for a
+, a
-, and mpi
ts exist which satisfy the inequality in (26) by
searching over s￿t and omitting comparisons between time periods when )p has the same sign as )yi
to adjust for demand shifts unmatched by supply shifts.
Unlike Ashenfelter and Sullivan, these deterministic tests compare all pairs of observations
except those representing clear shifts in the opposing market’s curve, hence making more complete
use of available information.  Nevertheless, the method is still subject to the standard criticism that
nonparametric techniques do not admit stochastic variation.  That is, profit maximization is rejected
from a single violation without regard to the severity of the violation.  
Nonparametric Statistical Test
In this section we develop a nonparametric approach that provides a probabilistic framework
for assessing market power exertion.  Following Love and Shumway, our test includes separate
measures for market power exertion and technical change. The deterministic model yields infeasible
solutions for periods in which observed market power is negative.  Even if the true market power

























n & $i)2 (29)
execute market power strategies.  Firms must base quantity choices on "perceived" residual supply
curves which depend on imperfectly forecasted supply relations and on competitors’ reactions which
are also unknown.  Errors in these forecasts or errors from other sources may result in imperfect
market power exertion.  In addition, observations may not be perfect measurements of behavior due
to measurement error (Varian (1985), Lim and Shumway).  
Stochastic variation can be incorporated into nonparametric market power tests through the
Lerner index.  Let $i represent firm i’s intended market power exertion.  Then the relationship
between firm i’s observed market power parameter mi
ts and its intended behavior $i is
where gi







1, it follows that Gi
V (gi 
ts / F i ) 
2 - P
2 V where V is the number of time period
comparisons excluding unmatched supply or demand shifts.  Solving (27) for gi
ts and substituting, we
obtain the test statistic:
Under H0:  mi
ts/rn = $i, E is distributed as a chi-squared statistic with V degrees of freedom where V
= (t
2 -t) - z, and z is the number of observations deleted because of unmatched supply or demand
shifts.   Generally Fi





















































can be computed.  In this case E = R/F
2 ~ P
2
V  and R# F
2 P
2
V under the null hypothesis.  We can
construct the critical value of the standard error of $i as Fc=(R/P
2
V, ")
.5 where " is the desired
significance level for P
2
V.    
The nonparametric statistical test for monopsony or monopoly power exertion can now be
implemented in the form of a quadratic programming problem.  In this test the constraint structure
remains the same as with the linear programming problem, except that the market power parameter
is no longer constrained to be positive.  The objective function for the monopsony power case is
replaced with
to incorporate the stochastic framework where $i
ms  is the hypothesized value of the monopsony
Lerner index and other variables are defined as before.  The monopsony case constraint is given in
(24).  Likewise, the objective function for the monopoly case becomes 
where $i
mp  is the hypothesized value of the monopoly Lerner index. The corresponding monopoly
case constraint is given in (26).  The test employs a stochastic framework, unlike previously
developed nonparametric market power tests.  We construct the critical value of the standard error
of $i as Fc=(R/P
2
V, ")
.5 where " is the desired significance level for P
2
V.  Using an approach analogous
to maximum likelihood estimation, we then choose $i that generates the lowest F c so $ i is most likely
to have generated the observed data.23
Data
Data used in this study consist of annual observations from the U.S. cigarette manufacturing
industry for the period 1977 to 1993.  Data and samples of TSP, SHAZAM, and GAMS programs
used to generate the following results are available on request.  Domestic cigarette production is
taken from USDA Tobacco Situation and Outlook (TSO) as the sum of four types of cigarettes:
standard cigarettes (70 mm nonfilter), filter tip cigarettes (80 mm), king (85 mm nonfiltered and
filtered) and extra long (100 mm filter tip).  Annual prices used to generate the Divisia price index
are reported in TSO and are calculated by weighting corresponding wholesale cigarette price
revisions by the fraction of the year that the price was in effect.  Excise tax data are also taken from
TSO.  The Divisia price index for domestic production is constructed net of excise taxes.    
Domestic tobacco price and quantity data are taken from various issues of TSO and consist
of estimated leaf used for unstemmed flue-cured, unstemmed burley, and unstemmed Maryland
tobacco.  Prices used to calculate a Divisia price index for domestic tobacco are annual average prices
received by growers for each tobacco type.  
The source for imported tobacco data is the Department of Commerce’s U.S. Imports for
Consumption and General Imports: FT246 and FT247.  The category of tobacco used in cigarette
production is called cigarette leaf tobacco.  It includes five types of tobacco:  unstemmed Oriental,
unstemmed flue-cured, unstemmed burley, stemmed tobacco except cigar leaf, and scrap tobacco
except cigar leaf.  Again, a Divisia price index is created using prices for each category computed
from quantity and import value information.
Residual materials cost is calculated by subtracting the cost of domestic and imported tobacco
from cost of materials as reported in the Annual Survey of Manufacturers, various issues.  The price
index of other materials is proxied by the producer price index for materials as reported in the24
Economic Report of the President.  A quantity index for other materials is constructed by dividing
the residual materials cost by the producer price index for materials.
Data on advertising expenditures are taken from TSO, various issues.  A quantity index for
advertising is obtained by dividing the cigarette industry’s reported annual expenditures on advertising
by the cost per thousand advertising price index for magazines.  The price index for magazines is
chosen as a proxy for the cost per unit of advertising since magazine advertisements represent a major
portion of advertising expenditures for cigarette manufacturers.  This index is constructed from
indices reported in USDA’s Food Marketing Review, 1992-1993 and from various issues of
Advertising Age.   
Data regarding the cost of labor and the number of employees in cigarette manufacturing are
taken from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers, various issues.  Total compensation is divided by
the number of employees to calculate average annual compensation per employee.  A Divisia price
index is then constructed to represent the price of labor.  
 Capital price is calculated as the annual cost per unit of capacity.  Total capacity is the proxy
for quantity of capital.  Total capacity is  recovered by dividing actual cigarette production by the
capacity utilization rate as reported in Annual Survey of Manufacturers, Current Industrial Reports,
Tobacco and Tobacco Products, various years.  Annual total cost of capital is calculated assuming
a 10 year depreciation rate of new capital expenditures (also from Annual Survey of Manufacturers)
with no salvage value.  A 5 year moving-average of Moody’s Aaa corporate bond rate from the
Economic Report of the President is used to estimate annual interest costs.  Total annual capital
service cost is the sum of depreciation charges and interest charges.  Dividing total capital services
cost by total capacity gives capital price per unit of capacity.  We then construct indices for the price
and quantity of capital.25
Implementation
We estimate Hall’s and Roeger’s nonstructural monopoly market power tests and the
analogous monopsony power counterparts for direct comparison to their original results and to
results from nonparametric market power test results.  We implement Ashenfelter and Sullivan’s
original method for comparison to their  original results.  Our revised version of Ashenfelter and
Sullivan’s method is employed for both monopsony and monopoly power.  We also implement Love
and Shumway’s deterministic test and the statistical test developed in this paper.  The nonparametric
methods are employed to investigate both monopoly and monopsony power.  Empirical equations
for each test are given in the appendix.  
Results
Table 1 compares our nonstructural model regression results with those of Hall and Roeger.
Our data differs from that of Hall and of Roeger in that we use 4-digit industry level data rather than
the more aggregated 2-digit industry level data.  We also include cigarette manufacturers’ advertising
and input costs.  Hall and Roeger estimate nearly identical markups of price over marginal cost (µ
mp).
Our estimate of (H is higher than Hall’s original estimate, implying lower market power exertion than
his study suggests.  However, neither Hall’s estimate nor our estimate of (H is statistically significant.
Our estimate of the market power index ($
mp) is very close to Roeger’s estimate and is statistically
significant.  Hall and Roeger interpret the parameter estimate for µ
mp as signifying a positive markup
of price over marginal cost, and hence, implying significant monopoly market power exertion. 
Ashenfelter and Sullivan’s nonparametric estimates of the lower bound for the “numbers
equivalent of Cournot firms” (CNE) are presented in Table 2 (CNE-A).  The CNE represents the
least number of firms with Cournot behavior that the industry could support.  Though there were only
eight cigarette manufacturers in 1992, we also report results for n=9 and n=4.  It is possible that firms26
exhibit behavior more competitive than Cournot behavior which would result in a CNE greater than
n=8.  Table 2 also includes the CNE for Ashenfelter and Sullivan’s method using our data(CNE-B),
as well as the CNE using our revised versions of Ashenfelter and Sullivan’s test where  (a) all
observations are compared except those where demand shifts occur (CNE-C) and (b) all observations
are compared except those where demand shifts occur and all costs are incorporated (CNE-D). The
CNE’s from Ashenfelter and Sullivan’s original study suggest that the cigarette industry has some
monopoly power but is not a perfect cartel.   For example, 70 percent of the observations support a
CNE of four Cournot firms.  The interpretation is that these observations support an industry with
no less than four Cournot firms.  This finding is about the same when we apply Ashenfelter and
Sullivan’s method to our data.  In contrast, the support for small CNE’s is much lower when the
revised Ashenfelter-Sullivan method is applied to our data.  Only 9 percent of the observations
support a CNE of four Cournot firms when all observations are compared  except when demand shifts
occur without corresponding supply shifts.  When all costs are included and demand shifts without
supply shifts are omitted, a four firm CNE is supported by 35 percent of the observations.  
Table 3 reports CNE’s using the revised methods for both the monopoly and the monopsony
power cases.  The revised methods for monopsony omit domestic tobacco input supply shifts without
corresponding input demand shifts.  In the monopsony power test, 89 percent of the observations
support a CNE of four Cournot firms when input costs other than domestic tobacco costs are
omitted.  When all input costs are included, the four-firm CNE increases to 98 percent.  In other
words, 98 percent of the observations, omitting supply shifts without demand shifts, support an
industry of no less than four Cournot firms.  We can also consider full collusive behavior, as defined
by a CNE of 1 firm.  The revised test, including all input costs, indicates that only 6 percent of the
observations support a CNE of one firm for monopoly while 94 percent of the observations support27
a CNE of one firm for monopsony.  This suggests that cigarette manufacturers’ exhibit collusive
behavior in purchasing of domestic tobacco, but they do not in the sale of cigarettes.  As with the
monopoly market power test, It appears that failure to account for all costs in the revised test may
understate monopsony market power exertion.  Results from the revised Ashenfelter and Sullivan
method imply that it is monopsony power, rather than monopoly power, that is being exerted by
cigarette manufacturers.  Both tests of monopsony market power imply a much smaller number of
CNE’s in the industry than do the tests of monopoly market power.
  A direct comparison of Hall, Roeger, Love and Shumway, and the statistical test can be
obtained via the Lerner index.  The comparison of Lerner index equivalents for monopoly and
monopsony market power tests is presented in Table 4.  Both Hall’s and Roeger’s methods indicate
substantial monopoly power exertion by cigarette manufacturers ($
mp of 0.34 and 0.63, respectively).
Results from the deterministic nonparametric test and the stochastic nonparametric test also support
the hypothesis of monopoly power exertion.  The deterministic test estimates $
mp=2.16 while the
stochastic test estimates  $
mp=2.2.  It should be noted that, theoretically, the monopoly Lerner index
has an upper bound of one.  Empirically, it is possible for $
mp>1 because of noise not captured in the
technical change variables or because of model misspecification.  Given that our results from other
tests indicate substantial monopsony power exertion, it is likely that misspecification (i.e. allowing
market power exertion in only one direction) has inflated the monopoly Lerner index estimates.  
Results from Love and Shumway’s deterministic nonparametric test and the statistical
nonparametric test support the hypothesis that cigarette manufacturers exert monopsony power in
addition to monopoly power.  Both tests give high estimates of monopsony market power exertion.
The deterministic test estimates the monopsony Lerner index as 2.44 and the statistical test estimates28
the index as 3.61.  It should be recalled that, unlike the monopoly Lerner index, the monopsony
Lerner index is not bounded by 1.0. 
Although Hall’s and Roeger’s estimates of the monopsony Lerner index are lower than those
obtained from Love and Shumway’s deterministic test and from the statistical test, each indicates
substantial monopsony power exertion ($
ms=
 1.70 and  $
ms=
 1.11, respectively).  These results provide
strong evidence that cigarette manufacturers exert monopsony power in addition to commonly
assumed monopoly power. 
Conclusions 
Nonstructural and nonparametric market power tests are useful because they do not impose
a functional form on the underlying behavioral equations.  We develop nonstructural monopsony
power tests analogous to nonstructural monopoly power tests developed by Hall; and by Domowitz,
Hubbard, and Petersen; and Roeger.  These nonstructural tests are implemented to test separately for
monopoly and monopsony power exertion.  Test results indicate that the cigarette manufacturing
industry exerts both monopoly and monopsony power.  Ashenfelter and Sullivan’s test, in its original
form, indicates a market structure for the cigarette manufacturing industry between collusion and
competition with some monopoly power exertion.  However, the test assumes a stable cost function
and so does not include cost information by observation.  It also compares only observations less than
two periods apart in an effort to minimize bias from incorrectly attributing the effects of a demand
shift to market power exertion.  We revise the test by including cost information and omitting only
comparisons where demand shifts clearly occur without corresponding supply shifts.  With these
admitted weaknesses of the test corrected and a similar test for monopsony developed, the revised
tests indicate that monopsony power is pronounced while monopoly power is much lower than
originally assessed.  Love and Shumway’s nonparametric deterministic test for monopsony market29
power is adapted to test for monopoly market power.  A nonparametric statistical test is also
developed to test for either monopsony or monopoly power exertion.  Monopoly power estimates
derived from these tests are substantial, as are monopsony power estimates.  Monopsony power
estimates indicate significant departures from competitive pricing in the input market for domestic
unprocessed tobacco.  Overall, our results suggest that not only do cigarette manufacturers deviate
from marginal cost pricing in the sale of their output, but they also exert monopsony power in the
procurement of domestic tobacco as an input.    30
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Table 1.   Regression Results for Nonstructural Monopoly Tests
a
Hall’s Method Roeger’s Method
DATA
























aThe subscript H denotes Hall’s method and R denotes Roeger’s method.  µ
mp
H is calculated as
1/(H and µ
mp
 R is calculated as 1/(1-$
mp).  t-statistics are in parentheses.
bResults for 2-digit industry level data are as reported by Hall and Roeger.  We repeated their test
using 4-digit data and advertising costs.
c Adjusted R
2 is not reported in Hall’s study.33
Table 2.  Firm Numbers Equivalent (CNE) for Monopoly using Original and Revised
Ashenfelter and Sullivan Approaches.










n = 1 24.4 53.3 4.7 6.3
n = 2 45.2 53.3 4.7 7.0
n = 3 60.4 66.7 5.5 17.2
n = 4 69.7 73.3 8.6 35.2
n = 5 75.1 73.3 12.5 49.2
n = 6 79.3 73.3 14.1 54.7
n = 7 82.9 76.7 16.4 60.2
n = 8 85.2 80.0 22.7 67.2
n = 9 86.5 86.7 26.6 74.2
n = 4 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
aCodes: v denotes number of observation pairs.
CNE-A denotes original A&S results comparing observations 2 years apart.
CNE-B denotes our application of original A&S method using 4-digit data and comparing
observations not more than 2 years apart.
CNE-C denotes revised A&S method using 4-digit data and comparing all observations
except those where demand shifts occur. 
CNE-D denotes revised A&S method using 4-digit data, incorporating costs (including
advertising), and comparing all observations except those where demand shifts occur. 34
Table 3.  Firm Numbers Equivalent for Monopoly and Monopsony 
using Revised Ashenfelter and Sullivan Approach
Percent Consistent with Numbers Equivalent











n = 1 4.7 33.9 6.3 94.2
n = 2 4.7 65.1 7.0 96.8
n = 3 5.5 80.4 17.2 97.4
n = 4 8.6 89.4 35.2 97.9
n = 5 12.5 93.1 49.2 98.4
n = 6 14.1 93.7 54.7 98.9
n = 7 16.4 93.7 60.2 98.9
n = 8 22.7 95.2 67.2 98.9
n = 9 26.6 95.8 74.2 98.9
n = 4 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
v denotes number of observation pairs included after omitting unmatched shifts in the opposing
market.35
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Appendix A
The Solow residual is derived as follows:
1) Totally differentiate firm i’s production function (16) with respect to time.  The firm index i
is dropped for notational simplicity.
Divide by y:
Now let  .  The last equality holds because all markets are "xj ’ fxjxji/yi ’ rjxji /py, j ’ 1, 2, 3
assumed competitive.  Appropriately substituting these definitions into equation (A2) gives 
Now let y/x1 = y , x2/x1 = x2, x3/x1 = x3.  Using these definitions, it follows that
.   Also by constant returns to scale, "x1, = 1 - "x2 - "x3.  Substituting these 0 y/y ’ 0 y/y & 0 x/x1
expressions into (A3) gives:
Equation (A4) gives the Solow residual.37
0 y/y & "Qagg 0 Qagg/Qagg & "us 0 Qus/Qus ’ 0 ( % $
mp0 y/y
0 y/y & "Qagg 0 Qagg/Qagg & "us 0 Qus/Qus ’ 0 ( % $
ms 0 Qus/Qus
Appendix B.  Empirical Equations for Nonstructural and Nonparametric Market Power Tests.
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p Domestic wholesale price of cigarettes, net of excise tax (Divisia index)
y Domestic quantity of cigarettes produced (1000's)
Pus Domestic price per lb. pd to producers (Divisia index)
Qus Domestic tobacco purchased by cigarette manufacturers (lbs)
Pi Price of tobacco imports (Divisia index)
Qi Imported tobacco for cigarettes (lbs)
Pl Average annual compensation of workers in cigarette manufacturers ($'s)
L Annual # of workers employed by cigarette manufacturers
Pm Price of materials other than tobacco (PPI for containers)
M Materials other than tobacco
Pa Price per unit of advertising (PPI for magazine advertising)
A Quantity of Advertising per year
Pc Price per Unit of Capacity
C Total annual capacity
Pagg Price index of variable inputs in aggregate (Divisia index, excludes domestic tobacco and capacity)
Qagg Quantity of variable inputs in aggregate (created from Divisia index, excludes domestic tobacco and capacity)
bQuantities are normalized by C
cPrices are normalized by Pc41
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